There is substantial field evidence that incentive pay increases the performance of workers when individual performance is measurable. Comparable evidence for teams, however, is scarce. We fill this gap by a randomized experiment on team incentives in a retail chain of roughly 200 shops and 1200 employees. It is technologically impossible to measure individual performance, but the firm measures team (shop) performance along various dimensions. Using stratified randomization, we introduced a team bonus conditioned on sales targets fixed well before the team incentive was discussed. Treated shops increase their sales on average by around three percent, wages increase by around two percent on average (and up to 13 percent). The team incentive works best for (i) shops in larger towns and cities where arguably the marginal productivity of effort is highest; (ii) shops with younger employees, for whom the marginal costs of effort is likely to be lowest, and (iii) shops that did not reach their targets regularly before the introduction of the bonus, for whom the effect of effort on the marginal probability of success is likely to be largest.
Introduction
"How can members of a team be rewarded and induced to work efficiently?" This is the question that Alchian and Demsetz (1972) asked more than 40 years ago in one of the most influential contributions to the economic literature on organizations. Alchian and Demsetz' focus was on input monitoring; an alternative would be incentives conditioned on joint output.
The very nature of teamwork, however, blurs the performance of individuals into a common performance signal, weakening the effect of monetary incentives (Holmström, 1982) . While there is substantial evidence that incentives work quite well provided individual performance is measurable (Lazear, 2000 , Shearer, 2004 , Bandiera et al, 2009 ), a number of questions are
open: under what conditions do team incentives raise efficiency in the field, and by how much (Bloom and van Reenen, 2011) , do such incentives lead to unintended reactions and gaming, and what mechanisms may affect performance?
We address this research gap through a randomized, controlled experiment in a retail chain in Germany. Our study is the first one in which the effect of team incentives is analyzed in a natural field experiment combining both realism and randomization (List and Rasul, 2011) . In particular, the employees are working in an ongoing firm and they are carrying out their normal day-to-day job. Besides the change in the compensation scheme, there is no other intervention, and we took great care in ensuring that employees would not consider themselves as part of an experiment. Except for our partners in management and the worker council, no one was aware of our involvement and communication was taken care of by management, not by us. The firm used the term "pilot", which they also use when introducing new HR or marketing practices for a limit period of time, and we conditioned incentive pay on the existing performance measurement system used for the compensation of middle and lower management.
Using the stratified randomization method developed by Barrios (2014) , we introduced a team bonus conditioned on sales targets that were fixed well before the team incentive was discussed. Treated shops increase their sales on average by around three percent, wages increase by around two percent on average (and up to 13 percent). The team incentive works best for (i) shops in larger towns and cities where arguably the marginal productivity of effort is highest; (ii) shops with younger employees, for whom the marginal costs of effort is likely to be lowest, and (iii) shops that did not reach their targets regularly before the introduction of the bonus, for whom the effect of effort on the marginal probability of success is likely to be largest. A fourth result is owing to an institutional specificity in Germany: roughly a third of the workers in our shops are so-called mini-jobbers, registered unemployed with an income (on top of unemployment benefits) of 450  or less. For tax reasons, these employees were not eligible for the bonus. We find that the treatment effect is lower in shops with a higher proportion of mini-job workers, although the eligible team members would receive a larger share of the team bonus (holding other things equal). This result points to the importance of complementarities between team members.
The main effect of the team incentive consists of an increase in the customers served, so incentives seem to increase operational efficiency, rather than increasing sales by upselling activities. We find no effect of team size on treatment effect, which seems counterintuitive from a free-riding perspective, but is in line with the "group-size paradox" analyzed by Esteban and Ray (2001) . We also find no evidence that the incentive is gamed as measured by additional orders of bread or higher return rates of unsold bread.
Our study distinguishes itself from the existing literature on the effect of group incentives and team work. First, in contrast to much of the literature, we look at small work teams in which people interact on a regular basis, and not on agencies or divisions like Propper et al (2011) , Courty and Marschke (1997) , or other papers surveyed by Prendergast (1997) . Second, we are dealing with a technology in which job design necessarily builds on team rather than individual work. (Why this is the case, we explain in the paragraph below).
Our question is not whether team rather than individual work is preferable for incentive and efficiency reasons (Itoh, 1991, Che and Yoo, 2001 ). Rather, we ask whether given technologically determined work organization in teams, an incentive can raise output (sales), in what magnitude, and what the impact of incentives depends on. Third, we control for variables widely believed to interact with team incentives, such as organizational commitment, job, and context satisfaction and perception of leadership, but find no significant results.
Our retail chain consists of shops where employees bake and sell pre-fabricated bread and cakes, prepare and sell sandwiches, snacks, and hot and cold beverages. On average, seven full-and part-time employees work in each shop, a third of the employees are minijobbers. Wages are low (on average around ten Euros), at a level slightly above the currently debated, but not yet implemented, nation-wide minimum wage. Individual work organization and performance measurement is impossible, because there is a broad variety of tasks each person has to carry out, including handling the goods delivered, preparing food in the oven, taking care of the customers, and handling the cash register. The time workers spend on each task varies much, people work in overlapping shifts and are supposed to help each other. The need to deal with different tasks of high volatility makes it too costly to have highly 4 specialized agents who would be idle most of their time. Furthermore, providing individual incentives would lead to measurement and gaming problems and productivity losses because of forgone help efforts among the members of the team (cf. Itoh, 1991 , Auriol et al, 2002 .
For many years prior to our intervention, shop performance has been measured along a number of dimensions, such as sales, personnel costs, and qualitative indicators, all of which have traditionally been used to incentivize top, middle and shop managers. Prior to the intervention, however, the more than 1,000 sales agents in the shops never received any performance related pay. In April 2014, in half of the almost 200 shops, we introduced a monthly team bonus. Shops were assigned to treatment and control groups through an optimal stratification procedure developed by Barrios (2014) . Management informed the teams in the treatment group through personal communication, letters and posters about the incentive scheme.
As usual in sales people compensation we used a step bonus function (Figure 1 ). We were aware that step functions have many issues, but linear compensation Teams that reached or surpassed by up to one percent the sales target defined by top management at the beginning of the year (well before the decision in favor of the team incentive was made) would receive a 100 Euros bonus. For each additional one percent of sales beyond the target, an extra bonus of 50 Euros was offered. The bonus was capped at 300 Euros when the sales exceeded the target by more than four percent. Teams were initially informed that the bonus would be paid for a pilot period of three months ending on the 30 th of June 2014. The teams were informed that the bonus would be shared among the full-and part time employees including the shop manager, according to the hours they worked in the respective month, compared to the total work hours of the team.
We find a treatment effect of roughly three percent on sales over the period between April and June 2014. Many of the teams reach sales levels beyond which the bonus is capped.
Interestingly, and contrary to the free-riding argument but in line with the literature on the group size paradox (Esteban and Ray, 2001) , larger shops in the treatment group fare no worse in terms of sales than smaller ones. Shops in cities compared to smaller municipalities feature treatment effects of around six percent, arguably because consumers react more intensively to increased sales activities. Shops that, in the past, were less likely to reach the sales targets react more intensively to the bonus than shops that were more likely. (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002) , entry barriers are low, and competitive pressure, in particular triggered by aggressive discounters such as Aldi and Lidl, is high. It is actually precisely the entry of these firms into the market of "our" chain that triggered the change in incentives that we analyze here.
Background
In 2013, we were contacted by the general manager of a bakery chain who sought advice on how to cope with the challenges of a rapidly changing market. Since the 1980s, bakery chains, some of them owning hundreds of shops and with sales numbers of up to a billion Euro, had successfully built their business model on attractive locations (including supermarkets and malls), and economies of scale. The chains had crowded out many of the existing small master bakeries whose number and market shares had steadily declined. In 2011, however, discounters Aldi and Lidl had begun to bake and sell fresh bread, rolls and related products in their dense network of shops, with large success. Their bread is widely believed to be of similar quality as the one of the chains, but sold at much lower prices, hence forcing the incumbent chains to rethink their business model. As a consequence, many of the on average. District managers, who are responsible for 10 to 15 shops, are incentivized through a number of targets along these dimensions, and the 193 shop managers receive bonuses when they reach certain sales and personnel cost targets and certain grades in regularly carried out mystery shopper visits (the topic of another paper of ours). However, sales agents, representing the bulk of staff, only receive fixed wages, which for most workers are regulated by collective agreements. There is also a second group of workers, on so-called mini jobs who can earn up to 450 Euro on top of their welfare benefits.
At the end of February 2013, we proposed introducing a team bonus conditional on reaching or passing the existing sales targets. Our partners first reacted surprised by this suggestion. A member of the management team put it bluntly: "We have never seriously thought about this." Other members of the management team were afraid that payments could turn out to be a burden on the firm. We provided our partners with some simulations showing that the expected payments would likely to be lower than 20,000 Euro per month in case (i) half of the shops were treated; (ii) a step function capped at four percent sales above the target was used; with (iii) a top monthly bonus of 300 Euro. While this convinced top managers to try a "pilot" study with half of the shops assigned to the team bonus, district managers were afraid that wage costs would rise, meaning that they could not reach the targets of keeping personnel costs low. The general manager reacted by suggesting that the extra bonus payments would be paid from a different budget and would not affect the personnel costs relevant for district managers' performance. District managers were quick to realize that in such a setting they were likely to benefit as well, if the team bonus resulted in an increase of sales of the shops under their supervision. The worker council also was in favour of the bonus, in particular, because it was designed as a pure add-on payment. Also, trust between worker council and management was high, and a new collective agreement had been written concerning fixed wages, such that ratchet effects were unlikely.
To reduce the risk of information leakage, middle management was informed about treatment and control shops under their purview only some days before introduction of the team bonus. Another concern was raised about the possibility of envy between treatment and control shops. We discussed this issue with the worker council who suggested that we should explain that the intervention was "just a pilot" and that everybody would have the same 50-50 chance of taking part in it. This, the worker council argued, would be acceptable for the nontreated shops in case they would learn about the bonus scheme in other shops. In the next section, we explain in more detail how we communicated the scheme and how we minimized the risk of contamination between the treated and non-treated shops.
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The experiment
In March 2014, a month prior to the introduction of the team bonus, and before its announcement to the employees and managers of the treatment group of shops, we carried out an employee survey in order to measure employee satisfaction with the job context, general situation, and organizational commitment, following some influential work in industrial psychology (Allen and Meyer, 1990) . In May, we carried out a second wave. This latter survey entailed the same questions plus additional items in relation to the team bonus, and some social interactions within and between shops.
Our partners and we thought the survey would be useful for a number of reasons. First, it would allow an additional check whether treatment and control groups were balanced samples; second, we hypothesized that the treatment effect may depend on employees' pretreatment satisfaction and commitment levels; third, because of the team bonus, employees' satisfaction levels could increase. The survey was distributed through the district managers and collected by our research assistants in sealed envelopes. Arguably, because the anonymous surveys were collected on site, and because of ours' and the district managers' substantial communication efforts, the feedback rates were almost 80 percent in the first and above 60 percent in the second wave of the survey.
In preparation of team bonus introduction, we designed information leaflets to be posted in the back offices of the treatment shops, and letters that were distributed by the district managers to the employees. In contrast to the employee survey, the logo of Goethe University did not show on these materials (see Appendix 2), so that people would not perceive themselves as part of an experiment. In fact, there was no mention of our research team in any communication regarding the bonus.
We trained district managers in how to explain the team bonus to shop managers. We also instructed them about how to react to questions of employees in control group shops about the bonus. In that case, district managers would explain that "this is a pilot. Everybody had the same chance to be drawn with a 50-50 chance. The work council agreed to this procedure." We were afraid that there could be contamination between the treatment and control group. Envy or frustration of control group shops could lead them to reduce their efforts, which could then be picked up erroneously as a positive treatment effect. To monitor this risk, we regularly called the district managers and asked them whether employees in the control group had asked them questions about the team bonus. We actually only heard about three cases in April, all of which were satisfied with their district manager's answer. In May and June, nobody inquired. In addition, we also regularly checked the Facebook page of the bakery on which customers and employees alike tend to discuss issues such as product quality but also (sometimes to the dissatisfaction of management) internal issues such as stress at the workplace, quality issues of products, or problems of leadership and organizational culture.
We could not find a single entry on the team bonus. However, we also built in some questions into the second wave of the employee survey to check for potential channels of contamination, in particular, we asked people how frequently they interacted with colleagues in the same and in other shops, and we found that contacts to employees in other shops are very rare: only 20% of respondents indicated that they ever spoke to a colleague from another shop. Hence, it seems fair to say that contamination between treatment and control shops is unlikely to be an issue. of additional goods to be sold per day (for instance a one-percent increase above the sales target for a mid-sized shop would be tantamount to selling per day ten additional rolls, two loafs of bread, some sandwiches and some cups of coffee). The fact that a number of shops failed to reach the target by small amounts (for instance, in April, one shop failed to reach the target by 16 Euros, and another one by 8 Euros) is an indicator that there was no manipulation and that at least in the beginning of the treatment phase, employees found it hard to estimate their likelihood to reach the various targets, although district managers regularly communicate to all shops, treatment and control shops alike, their current sales figures.
What rests to be explained is the randomization procedure. We follow Barrios (2014) who shows that randomizing pairwise by using the predicted outcome variable, in our case sales, minimizes the variance of the differences in the treatment and control outcomes post treatment. We use historic observations between January 2012 and December 2013 to run a regression of log sales on labor input with month and shop fixed effects, from which we obtain predicted sales. We then rank the shops according to the predicted sales and randomize within the pairs of shops with adjacent ranks (1-2, 3-4, ..., 192-193) . Because we had an odd number of shops in our sample, we excluded the shop with the median rank from the pairs and assigned it randomly. The resulting treatment and control groups comprised 97 and 96 shops, respectively. Table 1 summarizes their pre-treatment characteristics.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Thanks to our randomization procedure, the treatment and control samples are balanced in the average pre-treatment sales, our key outcome variable. They are also similar in other potentially relevant characteristics, such as the percentage of unsold goods, number of customer-visits, frequency of achieving the sales target, location, and employee attitudes.
In fact, none of the averages reported in Table 1 differ significantly between the groups. An average shop sells over 27,000 Euros worth of goods 5 , employs 7 people most of whom are female in their late 30s, unskilled, and working part-time. There is a sizeable share of workers on a mini-job, around 30%, who for tax reasons were excluded from the team bonus scheme.
Sales are quite variable, with location and size differences explaining 90% of the variance.
There is also a considerable variation within shops, much of which is due to seasonal demand, temporary closures for renovation, and market dynamics, such as the entry and exit of competitors, all of which factors we control in our statistical analysis. Table 2 reports the treatment and control shops characteristics in the treatment period (April to June 2014), giving a first impression of the treatment effect. Sales and customer-visits have gone down, reflecting the secular downward trend in the bakery business. Yet, the drop in sales and customer-visits being more pronounced in the control than in the treatment group suggests a positive treatment effect. In fact, the difference-in-difference estimated effects on the log sales and customer-visits are 3.3% and 2.8%, respectively, both significant at conventional levels. Since there is no significant treatment effect on other outcomes, we proceed with a more in-depth analysis of sales and customer-visits.
Baseline results
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
To visualize the treatment effect on sales, Figure 3 plots the treatment and control groups' year-on-year sales growth in the treatment month versus the sales levels in the same months (April to June) of 2013. Additionally, Figure 4 displays the kernel density graphs of the year-on-year sales growth for the two groups. There is a shift in the treatment group's sales growth distribution to the right from the control group's which is fairly uniform across the growth rates and initial sales levels.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
To identify the treatment effect in a more systematic way, we run the difference-indifference estimator in several regression specifications where we control for other factors that may affect sales and address the estimation issues most frequently discussed in the experimental econometrics literature. The first issue is serial correlation in the residuals, which leads to underestimated coefficient standard errors and false positives as a result (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) . The second is the correlation between the treatment status and the baseline outcome, which, despite randomization, may occur in finite samples, causing the "regression towards the mean" problem (Stigler, 1997) .
We start with a specification with shop and time fixed effects:
(1)
where ln(sales it ) is the log sales in shop i and period t, the treatment dummy takes the values 1 for the treatment and 0 for the control group shops, the after dummy is 0 for the periods before treatment and 1 thereafter, include the log total hours worked and dummies for renovation within the last two months, and error it is the idiosyncratic error term which we allow to correlate within each shop using the Stata cluster option. Coefficient  3 is the difference-in-difference estimate of the treatment effect. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 are based on equation (1). where is the average log sales pre ( =0) and post ( =1) treatment. Column 3 in Table 3 reports the treatment effect estimated with equation (2). Bootstrapping, another recommended solution, produces standard errors of similar magnitude.
To control for regression to the mean in we augment eq. (2) with past sales:
where regression errors are still clustered at the shop level. The estimates from equation (3) are reported in column 4 of Table 3 .
In the next series of specifications, we estimate the treatment effect by comparing post-treatment sales growth relative to a chosen baseline b in the treatment and control groups,
In principle, specification (4) is similar to (3), but some extra flexibility in regression specification is achieved by varying the baseline, , specifying it as the average sales across all months before the start of the treatment (column 5 in Table 3 ), the same months in 2013 (column 6), and the average sales in January-March 2014 (column 7).
Whatever specification we use, we obtain the average treatment effect estimates of similar magnitude -around 3% -and significance. This uniformity suggests that neither of the estimation issues we mentioned above and addressed in our analysis is important on our sample. Indeed, simply clustering the errors by shop is sufficient on the relatively large sample such as ours. Regression to the mean is not a concern either since our sample is well balanced. The estimated average treatment effect on sales of 3% implies an extra 820 Euros Table   4 ), we find it to be 2.9% in April 2014, 3.7% in May, and 2.9% in June, a steady effect without noticeable abatement. Also we estimate 50 research assistant days at the going rate of 110 Euro = 5,500 Euros.
Material and travel costs were around 12,000 Euros. The total implementation costs of the bonus scheme are thus 132,650 Euros, or about half its implied gains. Put differently, the bonus scheme as an "investment in people" project would break even within one quarter from its start.
In a meeting in June 2014, the management team decided to roll out the team bonus to all shops as of July 1st 2014. A collective agreement was written with the work council, according to which the team bonus would be granted until the end of 2014.
Treatment effect heterogeneity
Although our treatment and control groups are balanced across a number of characteristics that might affect sales, the treatment effect may still vary in magnitude between different shops in the treatment group. We expect the treatment effect to vary along several
dimensions, among which we analyze the following: shop location, workforce size and composition, success in reaching the sales target in the past, and employee attitudes.
Shop location
Shop location affects the magnitude of effort's response to a given incentive by changing the marginal product of effort. Thus, extra effort pays more in populous, urban locations that have office workers who might come in for lunch, and visitors who might buy a snack on the go; incentivized sales agent may "up-sell" to both these groups. On the other hand, smaller locations have mostly regular shoppers whose demand for bread is harder to affect -hence the lower marginal product of sales effort in those locations. Besides, shops in urban locations have more competitors nearby, whose customers may be won over. Table 5 reports the treatment effect by shop location. As expected, the treatment effect is largest, at 6%, in shops located in big towns (>60000 inhabitants), going down to 3.8% in midsize towns, and zero in villages. As before, the treatment effect is fairly stable in time.
Workforce size and composition
Shop workforce size will influence the magnitude of the treatment effect by increasing the total effort as the sum of individual efforts, as well as by decreasing the individual effort through free-riding. Which of these two opposite tendencies will prevail depends on the team production technology and the individual costs of effort function. Thus, Esteban and Ray (2001) show, in a collective action setting, that when the costs of effort are quadratic or steeper larger teams will outperform smaller ones in total effort even if there are no individual effort complementarities. The presence of complementarities, that is, rewards to individual team members being nonexcludable, or, equivalently, the total effort being more than the sum of individual efforts, will reduce the ``steepness'' of the costs of effort function required to deliver the total effort growing with team size.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
To measure the variation in the treatment effect with shop size, we interact the treatment dummy with the dummies for the quartiles of the shop-average number of workers not on a mini-job (the mini job workers did not receive a bonus). Table 6 shows that the treatment effect is larger in bigger shops (column 1), and that the observed differences in the treatment effect do not owe to bigger shops being located in bigger towns (column 2). In fact, the treatment effect increases with shop size faster in big towns than elsewhere.
Turning to the shop workforce composition, we explore treatment effect heterogeneity with shop workforce tenure, age, and the share of mini-job workers. We expect the treatment effect to be larger for younger workforce, since younger workers are on average poorer and thus more susceptible to material incentives. Besides, holding wealth fixed, there may be an element of resistance to change, which is weaker for younger workers, in the individual responses to our innovative treatment. Table 7 reports treatment effects in the shops below and above the median workforce age and tenure, on the whole sample as well as separately in big towns and elsewhere. Consistently with our expectations, ``younger'' shops respond to treatment more strongly. A further analysis suggests that the differential response to treatment by age and tenure is driven mainly by age: running our preferred difference-in-difference specification (1) with the treatment effect being interacted with age and tenure separately as well as jointly produces a significant interaction with age but not with tenure.
The treatment effect should decrease linearly with the share of mini-job workers in shop team, reflecting a decrease in the size of the team that is incentivized. There will also be an additional negative influence if there are effort complementarities between mini-job and ordinary workers, since stronger complementarities increase the weight of each worker's contribution to the total output 6 . To accommodate the later, nonlinear, effect, we rerun our regression specification with the treatment dummy interacted with the quartiles of the shopaverage share of mini-job workers. The results are reported in Table 8 .
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
We find that the treatment effect goes down with the share of mini-job employees, especially in the shops located outside big towns. The abrupt drop in the treatment effect to zero past the second (whole sample) or first (shops outside big towns) quartile of the average mini-job worker share implies a steeper than linear decrease, which suggests effort complementarities between mini-job and ordinary workers in shop team.
Past sales target achievement
We expect the treatment effect to vary with the past performance around the sales target. Historic record of achieving sales targets is informative for shop teams to gauge their probability of success in the future, since the targets are largely based on past sales (with a correction for the overall trend, hence the higher frequency of reaching the target in both groups, recall Table 2 ) and set in the beginning of the year. However, the pattern of the treatment effect's variation with past performance is hard to predict, since the marginal utility of effort, and hence the effort's response to treatment, is influenced by at least two opposing considerations. First, although for the more successful shops the expected bonus is higher, the marginal utility of putting more effort than before the treatment is lower because the bonus is capped. Hence, shops historically performing closer to the target would respond to treatment less strongly. On the other hand, shops that have been too unsuccessful in reaching their targets in the past may not react because reaching the target is not realistic enough. Table 9 reports treatment estimates by quartile of historic distance to the sales target, which is measured in two ways: i) as the difference between actual sales and sales target averaged for each shop over the pre-treatment period; and ii) as the frequency of each shop achieving its target in the pre-treatment period. Shops in the bottom three quartiles of the distance to the target reacted to the treatment more strongly than did those in the top quartile, suggesting that rewarding the attainment of too easily achievable targets is not an effective motivator.
Employee attitudes
We expect the effort response to treatment to vary with the workers' attitudes towards their employer. To investigate this possibility, as well as to gather important background data for our study, we ran questionnaires among the employees before (March) and after (May) the treatment. In the cover letter sent to every shop, we emphasized that this survey was for our research purposes and had nothing to do with their employer, and guaranteed anonymity of employees' response; we also distributed and picked up the questionnaires ourselves rather than let the company do so for us, as an extra guarantee of anonymity. We had an 80% response rate for the first survey, and 65% for the second.
There are three aggregate attitudes scores we measured in both waves of the questionnaire: commitment to the firm, satisfaction with the work context, and overall job satisfaction. None of these scores were affected by our treatment (recall Table 2 ). Moreover, none of them moderates the treatment effect, implying that workers' response to treatment does not depend on their attitudes towards their firm or their job.
Mechanisms
The extra 3% of sales in the treatment shops compared to control may have been achieved by serving more customers, selling more per customer, having a broader range of goods to better serve diverse customer demands, selling more side goods (drinks, snacks, etc.), or through a combination of the above mechanisms. In this section, we go through available empirical evidence to ascertain the likely role of each of these mechanisms.
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
We find a treatment effect on the number of customer-visits that is commensurate with that on sales ( Table 10 ), so that the effect on sales per customer visit is virtually nil. This finding implies that the role of mechanisms leading to more sales per customer visit, such as broader assortment and more side sales, is marginal. With most of the extra sales driven by the increase in the number of transactions, is it greater operational efficiency or better customer service that drove this increase? Greater efficiency would be part of the explanation if there were longer queues before the treatment than thereafter. However, comparing the mystery shopping reports in April to June 2014 with those in January to March 2014 (immediately before treatment), we see no change in the reports on salesperson availability, which was generally rated as high. Hence, there is no evidence to suggest a significant decrease in the customer queues.
Turning to better customer service as the remaining explanation, we ran our own mystery shopping tour of 140 randomly selected shops in our sample (capacity constraints prevented us from touring every shop). Our research assistants were instructed to act like ordinary customers and to buy the ``bread of the month'' or the closest substitute to it. After leaving the shop, they were asked to take note of how friendly the sales staff were, and whether the question ``Would you like anything else?'' or similar was asked. We found that while the frequency of asking the ``anything else?" question was comparable in the control and treatment groups overall (0.72 control vs. 0.79 treatment), in big towns, where the treatment effect was largest, the treatment shops asked this question significantly more frequently: 0.82 of the time vs. 0.61 in the control shops. We have also found a positive correlation, though insignificant, between asking this question and monthly sales in the treatment period. However, rerunning our regressions with the ``anything else?" question included as control, we see no reduction in the treatment effect. In sum, although there are signs pointing to the importance of enhanced customer experience in shaping the treatment effect, we do not have strong enough evidence to precisely identify the mechanism that drove our results.
Conclusion
Teams are a ubiquitous feature of modern production, and so are monetary incentives.
While the knowledge about the effectiveness of individual incentives is both broad and deep, much less is known about team incentives. Problems of endogeneity, complementarities and self-selection into teams make causally interpretable evidence about the effectiveness of team incentives hard to obtain. We contribute to the incentives literature by providing evidence on the effectiveness of team incentives. We have designed a fairly large randomized controlled experiment with 193 shops of a bakery chain in Germany. Power calculations on the basis of 27 months of observations pre treatment and 3 months post treatment informed us that we would need 70 shops in each group to detect a 3 percent treatment effect at a significance 19 level of 5 percent with the probability 0.9. Our estimated treatment effect is indeed around 3%, and is highly significant. There is also substantial heterogeneity, with the treatment effect being largest in big towns, shops with younger workforce and few mini-job employees. The single most important immediate cause of the treatment effect on sales we find is increased customer traffic; there is no effect on sales per customer visit. We are unable to precisely distinguish between greater operational efficiency (that is, smaller queues) and better customer service as the two mechanisms that led to higher sales through increased customer traffic. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Column 3 reports the p-values of the two-sided t-test of equality of the means for a selection of variables. "Big town", "medium/small town" and "village" refer to municipalities with more than 90,000; 5,000 to 60,000; and fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, respectively. Panels D and E are based on the personnel records from the firm as of July 1 2014, excluding apprentices and interns (18 in the control and 11 in the treatment group). Panel F reports the means of the commitment, work satisfaction and overall satisfaction scores constructed according to Allen and Meyer (1990) from the employee survey administered in March 2014. In total, 563 employees in the control, and 580 employees in the treatment group participated in the survey (response rate 79.5%). The table shows the difference-in-difference treatment effect estimates based on several regression specifications with the log sales as the dependent variable. In all specifications the unit of observation is individual shop. In specification 1, we regress monthly sales from January 2012 until June 2014 on the "treatment group" and "after treatment" dummies and their cross-product. Specification 2 is the same but omits the outliers, defined as year-on-year sales change exceeding 30% (roughly the top and bottom 1% of the sales growth distribution). The reasons for such substantial increases or decreases in sales are construction sites close to the bakeries, competitors who enter or leave the market, temporary closures of shops because of renovations or sunny weather, which affects sales in bakeries located in shopping centers. Specification 3 is the same as 1, except that we use log average sales over the periods before and after the treatment (hence two observations per shop). Specification 4 includes past sales as an additional control, hence one observation per shop. In specification 5, we regress the log monthly sales in April, May and June 2014 (the treatment period) on the treatment dummy and the baseline sales in the respective shop, defined as the log average sales over the pre-treatment period. In specification 6, we regress the log monthly sales in the treatment period on the treatment dummy and the log sales in the respective months in 2013. Specification 7 is the same as 5 except that we use the log average sales in January-Mach 2014 as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered by shop. Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors (available on request) are similar in magnitude. The regression specification is the same as spec. 1 in Table 3 : The log monthly sales regressed on the "treatment group" and "after treatment" dummies, their cross-product, and controls. The regression specification is the same as spec. 1 in Table 3 . The cells in the table give estimated treatment effect in a given month and location. For example, 0.065 is the treatment effect in April 2014 in shops located in big towns. Standard errors are clustered by shop. Shop size is defined as the number of workers employed in a shop excluding those on a mini job. Quartile of shop size is defined separately for each subsample (shops located in big towns tend to employ more workers). Standard errors are clustered by shop. The share of mini-job workers is defined as the ratio of the hours worked by these workers to the total hours worked. Quartiles of the share of mini-job workers are very similar for every location, and so are defined on the whole sample. Standard errors are clustered by shop. The regression specification is the same as spec. 1 in Table 3 . Standard errors are clustered by shop. 
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